Desire-Pleasure-Jouissance

In the Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault said some profound things about statements [énoncés] that concern several domains at once, even if not at the same time. I take two very vague examples. There is a moment in the Greek City when statements of a new type emerge, and these statements of a new type emerge within assignable temporal arrangements, in several domains. They can be statements concerning love, concerning marriage, concerning war, yet we feel that there is a kind of kinship or community among these statements. We have seen certain thinkers try to give explanations of how statements emerge in diverse domains that have this kind of kinship. In Greece, for example, during the "hoplite" reform, new types of statements concerning war and strategy emerge, but also new statements concerning marriage and politics. All this, it has been said, cannot be unrelated. There are some people who immediately say, for example, that there is a system of analogies or a system of homologies, and that perhaps all these statements refer to a common structure. They are called: structuralists. Others will say that these productions of statements depend on a certain domain which is determinative in relation to the others. Such people, for example, we will call: Marxists.

Perhaps it would be better to look for something else.

There’s a book from which one can learn many things, entitled Sexual Life in Ancient China [by Robert H. van Gulik (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961)]. This book shows clearly that manuals of love and manuals of military strategy are indiscernible, and that new strategic and military statements are produced at the same time as new amorous statements. That's curious. I ask myself: OK, how can we extract ourselves, at the same time, from a structuralist vision that seeks correspondences, analogies, and homologies, and from a Marxist vision that seeks determinants. I indeed see one possible hypothesis, but it's so confused . . . . It's perfect. It would consist in saying: at a given moment, for reasons that, of course, must still be determined, it is as if a social space were covered by what we would have to call an abstract machine. We would have to give a name to this non-qualified abstract machine, a name that would mark its absence of qualification, so that everything will be clear. We could call it -- at the same time, this abstract machine, at a given moment, will break with the abstract machine of the preceding epochs -- in other words, it will always be at the cutting edge [à la pointe], thus it would receive the name machinic point [pointe machinique]. It would be the machinic point of a group or a given collectivity; it would indicate, within a group and at a given moment, the maximum of deterritorialization as well as, and at the same time, its power of innovation. This is somewhat abstract at the moment, it's like algebra. It's this abstract machine which, in conditions that will have to be determined, it's this machinic point of deterritorialization that is reterritorialized in this or that machine, or in this or that military machine, amorous machine, productive of new statements. This is a possible hypothesis. I have the impression that there are things in Leroi-Gourhan we could use here, we would have to see how that works. This machinic point would indicate a kind of speed of deterritorialization. There are systems of indices under which reterritorializations are made in qualified machines, war machines, machines of love, machines of marriage.

Kyril Rejik: This is your "series" [enfilades] which are taken up again in networks?

Gilles Deleuze: Ah, no, that's something else. As you sense, at bottom this is not our hypothesis. That's because in this problem of where statements come from, what their production is related to, the sub-jacent response will consist in answering: there are no individual statements, and this is one of the multiple traps of psychoanalysis, which is the inheritor of a type of thinking which we could call Western thought, and which says that there are individual statements. And finally, the form or logic of individual statements has been fixed by the cogito. It has been fixed by the cogito which comprehends the production of statements from the subject, from a subject. Cogito: this means that every statement is the production of a subject. It means that firstly; and secondly, it means that every statement splits the subject that produces it. Lacan is the last Cartesian. Then every statement refers to a subject, and every statement splits, cuts, separates the subject that produces it. It is propositions that are linked up naturally, because if it is true that a statement is produced by a subject, then for that very reason this subject will be divided into the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement. This is what the literal process [démarche] of the cogito consists of.

The process of the cogito, you recall, is: I can say "I think, therefore I am," but I can't say "I walk, therefore I am." Descartes explains this in his Responses to Objections, in Descartes's rare comic pages. Someone has objected, "Why don't you say 'I walk' like 'I am'?" and he says, "I can't." That amounts to saying that "I walk" is a subject of the statement, whereas "I think" is the subject of enunciation. Then, perhaps I'm not walking, but there's one thing I'm sure of, and that is that I'm thinking of walking. In other words, the subject cannot produce a statement without being thereby split [scindé] by the statement into a subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement. This introduces the entire metaphysics of the subject into psychoanalysis. If we look closely at the cogito. . .

Question: But there is no alterity in Descartes.

Gilles Deleuze: What are you looking for? And dualism! There is a dualism at the level of thought and the object thought. There is a dualism at the level of soul and body, there are as many dualisms as you like. And if we ask: What is the source of all the Cartesian dualisms? --it lies in this scission internal to the subject, between the subjects of the statement, which allow no conclusion, and a subject of enunciation, which is subtracted from doubt: "I think."
In the entire series of Cartesian dualisms (soul-body, thought-extension, statement-enunciation), the only remark and the only question is that this isn't the final aspect. The duality of subjects of the statement and subjects of enunciation -- once again, the subjects of statements of the type "I am walking," "I am breathing," "I imagine," and the subjects of enunciation "I think" -- Is it not this duality that will inhabit all the dualisms of reflection and all the other dualisms of substances, bodies, etc.

I take up again, I'm thinking of the text where Descartes says, it may be -- I see a unicorn, or I imagine a unicorn -- it may indeed be that the unicorn does not exist, it may very well be that the proposition, that the statement "I see a unicorn" is false. But in return, it's true that I think I am seeing a unicorn. At this level, a kind of disengagement of a subject of enunciation occurs, and thereby all the subjects of possible statements. Whence he will say to you: I cannot say "I walk, therefore I am," for from a subject of the statement I cannot conclude a being of enunciation, or the being of a subject of enunciation; but I can say "I think, therefore I am," because from a subject of enunciation I can conclude the being of this subject. Now all the dualisms of Descartes, even passion and action, depend strictly on this operation of the cogito, which consists of relating statements to a subject of enunciation, which will consequently split the subject in two: the subject of the statement, and the subject of enunciation. This will be found, for example, at the Cartesian level, in the subject of the statement, which in the end refers to the union of the soul with the body, and the subject of enunciation, which refers to the thinking subject. When I say that, in a certain manner, psychoanalysis is the final inheritor of Cartesianism, it is because, even looking at the cogito, it is very curious at what point it is an Oedipal apparatus, a sublimated Oedipal apparatus. It could very well be that I myself, as a living being, have been made by my father and my mother. But the fact that I think, that isn't explained by my father and mother, that's explained by what? If we consider the cogito as a machine, we can see three great moments in it: doubt--which is typically a type of paranoiac machine; the non-deceiving God is a miraculating [trans: reading "miraculante" for "déraillante"] machine, and the "I think" is a celibate machine. That is the Oedipal space of pure thought. There are Oedipuses everywhere; there are not only familial Oedipuses, there are also scientific Oedipuses; and the philosophical Oedipus is the cogito, it is the Oedipal machine at the level of thought. This is what one calls dualism. Dualism is what prevents thought. Dualism always wants to deny the essence of thought, namely, that thought is a process. And the source of dualism, it seems to me, is this type of reduction, this flattening of all statements of thought, precisely, by this speculative, Oedipal apparatus in which the statement, on the one hand, is related to the subject, to a subject, and on the other hand, and simultaneously, the subject is split into a subject of the statement and the subject of enunciation. In this perspective, the subject is rethought.

There is only one form of thought, it's the same thing: one can only think in a monistic or pluralistic manner. The only enemy is two. Monism and pluralism: it's the same thing, because, in a certain manner, it seems to me that every opposition, even all possibilities of oppositions between the one and the multiple . . . . This is because the source of dualism is precisely the opposition between something that can be affirmed as one, and something that can be affirmed as multiple, and more precisely, what signals it as one is precisely the subject of enunciation, and what signals it as multiple is always the subject of the statement . . . . We saw last time how to bring about the suppression of the opposition between the one and the multiple. It happens the moment the one and the multiple cease to be adjectives and give way to the substantive: there are only multiplicities. That is to say, when the substantive "multiplicities" takes the place of the one, of the multiple and their **** and at this moment, one and multiple lose absolutely all meaning, at the same time as the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement. There are multiplicities, which obviously implies a theory and practice of multiplicities. Wherever we leave the domain of multiplicities, we once again fall into dualisms, i.e., into the domain of non-thought, we leave the domain of thought as process.

Now to show at what point things become botched, I always think of this history of desire. What I have been saying since the beginning amounts to saying that thinking and desiring are the same thing. The best way to avoid seeing or to refuse to see that desire is thought, that the position of desire in thought is a veritable process, is obviously to link desire to lack. Once desire is linked to lack, one is immediately in the domain, one has already assumed the basis of dualism. But today I would like to say that there are more underhanded ways of reintroducing lack into desire, either through the Other, or through dualism. Here, so-called Western thought is constructed from the relation between desire and pleasure, a completely rotten [pourrie] conception.

The first malediction of desire, the first malediction that weighs on desire like a Christian curse, and goes back to the Greeks, is that desire is lack. The second malediction is: desire will be satisfied by pleasure, or will be in an enunciable relation with jouissance. Of course, there will be those who will tell us that these are not the same thing. Nonetheless, there is a peculiar circuit here: desire-pleasure-jouissance. And all that, once again, is a way of cursing and liquidating desire.

The idea of pleasure is a completely rotten [pourrie] idea. One only has to look at Freud's texts, at the level of desire-pleasure, which amount to saying that desire is above all a disagreeable tension. There are one or two texts where Freud says that, after all, perhaps there are agreeable tensions, but again that doesn't take us very far. Broadly speaking, desire is lived as such a disagreeable tension that -- a horrible, hideous word is required here, that's how bad this thing is -- a discharge is necessary. And this discharge, this is what pleasure is! People will have peace, and then, alas! desire is reborn, a new discharge will be necessary. The types of conceptions that are called, in scholarly terms, hedonistic, namely, the search for pleasure, and the types of mystical conceptions that curse desire, by virtue of what is fundamental in lack --I would simply like you to sense that, in any case, they both consider desire to be a dirty little thing that wakes us up, and that wakes us up in the most disagreeable manner: either by putting us in relation with a fundamental lack, which can then be assuaged by a kind of activity of discharge, and then one will have peace, and then it will all begin over again . . . . When one introduces the notion of jouissance into all that -- you can see I'm in the process of trying to make a circle, very muddled, a pious circle, a religious circle of the theory of desire -- we can see at what point psychoanalysis is impregnated, and how great the psychoanalytic piety is. This circle, one of its segments is desire-lack, another segment is pleasure-discharge, and once again, they are completely linked.

And then I ask myself: What's wrong with Reich? There are two great errors in Reich: the first error is dualism, then he passes to the side: it's the dualism between two economies, between a political economy and a libidinal economy. If one speaks of a duality between two economies, one will always be able to promise to make the connection [branchement], but the connection will never be made. And this error of dualism has a repercussion at another level: desire is still thought of as a lack, and thus it is still thought with pleasure, as its unit of measure. And Reich has indeed given the word pleasure a stronger and more violent word, he calls it orgasm. His entire conception of the orgasm, which he will try to turn against Freud, consists in pushing desire to the limit insofar as it is linked to lack. If it cannot manage to obtain the discharge that assuages it, it will produce what Reich calls stasis. Desire is fundamentally related to the orgasm, and in order to relate desire to pleasure or to the orgasm, one must relate it to lack. It is exactly the same thing. The first proposition is the inverse of the second.

If we add the third arc of the circle: desire-lack, all that always concerns desire which is directed toward transcendence. In effect, if desire lacks something, it is like intentionality aiming at what it lacks, it is defined as a function of transcendence, in the same way that is it measured as a function of a unit that is not its own, which will be pleasure or the orgasm, which assures its discharge. And, in order to close the circle, which for the moment has only two arcs -- obviously, the theme that consists in establishing a distinction between jouissance and pleasure is very useful. This is what will make the whole thing function together. I am thinking notably of a distinction dear to Lacan, but I'm not familiar with it, the distinction between jouissance and pleasure. I recall what Barthes said about it in his last book, The Pleasure of the Text, where he explains it a little. He distinguishes texts of pleasure and texts of jouissance. This is what he says about texts of pleasure: "the text that contents, fills, grants euphoria; the text that comes from culture and does not break with it, is linked to a comfortable practice of reading. Text of jouissance: the text that imposes a state of loss, the text that discomforts, … unsettles the reader's historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, memories…Now the subject who keeps the two texts in his field and in his hands the reins of pleasure and jouissance is an anachronic subject, for he simultaneously and contradictorily participates in the profound hedonism of all culture…and in the destruction of that culture: he enjoys the consistency of his selfhood (that is his pleasure) and seeks its loss"--the loss of self--"(that is his jouissance). He is a subject split twice over, doubly perverse." [Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text (Hill & Wang, 1975, trans. Richard Miller, p.14; trans. modified]

Incredible. We here recover the duality of the subject of the statement, capable of pleasure, and the subject of enunciation, deserving of jouissance. Only, just as the subject of the statement never raises itself to the subject of enunciation, because the subject of enunciation is finally the great signifier, it goes without saying that jouissance is impossible. This means, as Barthes is in the process of explaining, that jouissance is in a fundamental relationship with death, so that we can close our circle: desire-lack, desire-pleasure or orgasm, desire jouissance. Happily, in an even clearer text, Barthes goes so far as to say: " Is pleasure only a minor bliss? Is bliss nothing but extreme pleasure?" No. It's not that one is stronger than the other, or the other less strong; they differ in nature. If one says that desire and jouissance are "parallel forces, that they cannot meet, and that between them is more than a struggle: an incommunication, then I must certainly believe that history, our history, is not peacable and perhaps not even intelligent, that the text of bliss always rises out of it like a scandal (an irregularity), that it is always the trace of a cut, of an assertion…" [Barthes, Pleasure p.20, trans. modified]. We could go on. . . . " What's happening here?

I'm thinking of this book on sexual life in ancient China. It recounts a strange story, in the end we are all Chinese: in Taoism, it varies throughout the ages, in any case, the reader is struck by the glory of the men and women in it. . . . But that's not what marks its difference from Western thought, because, from the side of Western thought, that doesn't work more strongly; the difference is elsewhere.

What's different is the way desire is experienced in a totally different manner: it's not related to any transcendence, it's not related to any lack, it's not measured by any pleasure, and it's not transcended by any jouissance, under the form or myth of the impossible. Desire is posited as a pure process. Concretely, this means that it is not at all the orgasm; their problem is not at all the Western problem, which is: How to extract sexuality from genitality. Their problem is: How to extract sexuality from the orgasm? Then, broadly speaking, they say: You understand, pleasure or orgasm, that's not the achievement of the process, it is either its interruption or its exasperation, or the two amount to the same thing, and it's completely deplorable! No doubt, that has to happen, but then one has to perceive these moments of suspension as veritable suspensions that allow the process to once again be set in motion. They have a theory of female energy and male energy, which consists in saying, broadly: female energy is inexhaustible, male energy, it's more annoying, it's exhaustible. The problem, in any case, is that the man takes something from the female energy which is inexhaustible, or that each takes something from the other. How can that be done?

Flows are necessary -- and indeed this is a thought in terms of flows -- the feminine flow, following very determined trajectories, rises up following the lines of masculine flow, along the spinal column, to go to the brain, and that's desire in its immanence as a process. One borrows a flow, one absorbs a flow, one defines a pure field of immanence of desire, in relation to which pleasure, orgasm, jouissance are defined as veritable suspensions or interruptions. That is, not as the satisfaction of desire, but as the contrary: an exasperation of the process that makes desire come out of its own immanence, i.e., its own productivity. All this is interesting for us, to the degree that, in this thought, desire simultaneously loses any link with lack, with pleasure or orgasm, or with jouissance. It is conceived as the production of a flow, it defines a field of immanence, and a field of immanence--that means a multiplicity in which, effectively, any splitting of the subject into a subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement becomes strictly impossible, since in our revolving machine it was very simple: the subject of enunciation was the subject of impossible jouissance, the subject of the statement was the subject of pleasure and of the search for pleasure, and desire-lack was the splitting of the two. That should tell you to what degree, from Descartes to Lacan, this repugnant thought of the cogito is not only a metaphysical thought.

The entire history of desire -- and once again, Reich falls in the same way -- this way of linking desire to a beyond, whether it's that of lack, or pleasure, or jouissance, and of posing the dualism between the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement. And it isn't by chance that it's the same people who are doing it today, i.e., the Lacanians, i.e., engendering all statements from the subject, which consequently, and retroactively, becomes the subject split into the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement. What is inscribed is the subject of enunciation, which links desire with the impossible jouissance; the subject of the statement, which links desire with pleasure; and the cleavage of the two subjects, which links desire with lack or castration. And at the level of theory, the production of statements exactly covers this rotten theory of desire, word for word. It is in this sense that I'm saying that thought is indeed monist, in the very apprehension of the identity of thought and process; as well as in the apprehension of the identity of process and desire: desire as constitutive of its own field of immanence, that is, as constitutive of the multiplicities that populate it. But all this is perhaps obscure, a monistic field is indeed a field inhabited by multiplicities.

Kyril Rejik: Yes, but I find that dangerous, because monism is considered to be something completely different, like the result of a dialectic coming from dualism. Hegel, for example.

Gilles Deleuze: But that's a false monism.

This magical operation that consists in forbidding the employment of the adjectives one and multiple, in order to retain only the substantive multiplicities. . . . This is the operation that gives an account of the identity of monism and pluralism, and which related the true source of dualism to the duality established between the two adjectives: the one and the multiple. The ground of dualism has always been: there are things that are one. Here one always recovers Descartes, because today we are talking about Descartes, i.e., Lacan. And then there are things that are divisible. Dualism is not defined by two, dualism is defined by the employment of the one and the multiple as adjectives. This is already true in Duns Scotus. So that, instead of using the one and the multiple as adjectives, one substitutes the substantive multiplicities in the form: there is nothing that is one, there is nothing that is multiple, everything is multiplicities. At this moment, one can see the strict identity of monism and pluralism in this form of a process of immanence which can be neither interested -- and this is what the Chinese tell us in their sexual wisdom -- nor exasperated. The process of immanence is also a multiplicity, i.e., to design a field of immanence populated by a multiplicity.

Kyril Rejik: A minute ago, you spoke a dualism as a result of Oedipus. Since, on the other hand, you think of Oedipus as a transitory machine between the affairs of the mass, the pack, or the affairs of paranoia or schizophrenia, you thus have a production of this dualism from a dualism that is proper to you (you don't return like that) at the level of the functioning of this process. This is what you have been explaining for two or three years.

Gilles Deleuze: That has been over for two or three years, it's finished. Here, today, I am reintroducing no dualism. Forget the rest.

When I say: the cogito is Oedipal, it matters little. . . . It would be necessary to find, moreover. . . . The first formulations of the cogito must be in Sophocles' Oedipus, even in the Cartesian texts, this entire progression is there, the assimilation to the three stages of the Oedipal machine, with paranoiac doubt, the non-deceiving, miraculating God, and the "I think." That appears to me to be almost ***** that is, what I mean is that any theory which, in one way or another, relates the production of statements to a subject is firstly a theory that will necessarily divide the subject in two: the subject of the statement and the subject of enunciation. Secondly, it will involve us in all sorts of submissions, by telling us, in the most hypocritical manner, that you're the boss! What I would like to make clear is this is all the same thing. And thirdly, the figures of desire, in the sense that desire is linked to lack, or, what amounts to the same thing, desire is linked to the trinity pleasure-orgasm-jouissance. Voilà.

Why this second point? Why this most hypocritical submission? It is because this history of the splitting of the subject always consists in saying: it is you who command, i.e., you will accede to the commandment to the degree that you submit yourself to a order, which you are not subject to without also being its legislator. This is the famous order of democracy. You are a legislator insofar as you are a subject; and it is not by chance that the person who pushed this doctrine the farthest, the formalism of this doctrine, is the inheritor of Descartes from the viewpoint of the cogito, namely, Kant, and that the submission to reason is presented to us as the manner in which we become legislators. This always refers us to the division of the subject into a subject of the statement and a subject of enunciation: you will obey as the subject of the statement, but because it is you who command as the subject of enunciation, and we are led to grasp this great split identity -- as a barred identity, whatever you like -- between the legislator and the subject. It's the same thing; it's the same mechanism, which thereby claims to engender statements in relation to a subject; which posits the duality of a subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement as the source of all the other dualisms, which thus suppresses thought as a process; and which, thirdly, destroys any position of desire, because by relating desire to lack, pleasure, and jouissance, it in effect leaps in favor of the appearance of thought, i.e., in favor of an image of thought. We could contemplate the image of thought in dualism, whereas there is no reality to thought except in the monism of the process and in the multiplicities that populate the field of immanence.

So that when the Chinese define this field of immanence of desire traversed by flows -- which pursue neither the possible pleasure at the level of the subject of the statement, nor the impossible jouissance at the level of a pseudo-subject of enunciation -- at the same time, they give themselves all the conditions for an entire theory of desire and a theory of the production of statements.

A final step to take: Why do they look for the theory of the production of statements in a military art, that is, in a war machine, a strategic war machine, while at the same time looking for the theory of desire in manuals of sexuality? The two types of manuals are strictly ***** with each other. Which is to say that they define multiplicities communicating within the process, or within the field of immanence itself.

Kyril Rejik: With this little difference, that the manuals of sexology are completely phallocratic and Chinese politics is completely imperial.

Gilles Deleuze: OK, but that's a detail, because that's not what makes the difference between the East and the West. You could say the same thing about the West; if you're looking for the difference, it's certainly not there. That it's phallocratic and imperial, OK, but that's more the common background. What this means is that it's not enough to define desire as a field of immanence in order to escape imperialism, etc.
Is this clear, this relation between the theory of statements and the conception of desire?

Interruption

No one can say anything about the difference in Lacan between pleasure and jouissance?

Intervention: Desire entails an enunciable relation with jouissance.

Gilles Deleuze: We can see how this all takes part in the same thing. To say that jouissance is not pleasure, that it takes part in a kind of system, which, in order to simplify it, I would present as a circular conception of desire in which, at the bottom, there is always the same starting postulate -- and it is true that Western philosophy has always consisted in saying: if desire exists, it is the very sign, or the very fact, that you are lacking something. Everything starts from that. A first welding of desire-lack is brought about; from there, it goes without saying that desire is defined as a function of a field of transcendence; desire is desire for what one does not have; that begins with Plato, it continues with Lacan. This is the first malediction of desire, it's the first way to curse desire; but it is not sufficient.
What I'm doing is following Plato's method in the Phaedo, when he constructs a circle from arcs.

The second arc: if desire is fundamentally aimed at an Other, open to a transcendence, if it is subjected to this first malediction, what is it that can come to fulfil it? What can fulfil it will never be the object toward which it tends, except in appearance, for it is the Other, it is unattainable, is the pure transcendent. Thus, that can't be what fulfils it. What comes to fulfil it or satisfy it, what gives it a pseudo-immanence, will be what is called a state of pleasure. But at this second level, it's understood that this immanence is a false immanence, since desire has been fundamentally defined in relation to a transcendence, and this fulfilment is, à la lettre, an illusion. Second malediction of desire: it's a matter of calming desire for a moment, and then the malediction will begin again. And then it will be necessary to call it up again, and then it's the conception of pleasure-discharge. This word is enough to indicate that the title of this second arc of the circle is "To Provisionally Have Done With Desire." This is what's fascinating to me: the point at which all this is retained in Reich's protest against Freud. He retains this conception of desire-discharge, which he thematizes in the theory of the orgasm. This second arc clearly defines this type of illusory immanence through which pleasure fulfils desire, that is to say, it obliterates it for a while. But, as in any good construction -- because all this is a pure construction -- it's not true, it's false from start to finish.

A third arc is needed to close the circle, since you have this supposed truth of desire linked with a transcendence of the Other, this illusion or this deception through which desire encounters calming discharges in which it disappears, even if it reappears the next day. A third arc is needed to give an account of this: that even through these states of sleep, satisfaction, etc., the irreducibility of desire to states of pleasure, which only satisfy it in appearance, must be reaffirmed, it must be reaffirmed in another mode: transcendence. And this reaffirmation is the impossible jouissance-death relation. And from start to finish, it is the same conception. And when someone tells us: watch out, don't confuse desire, pleasure, jouissance, obviously we shouldn't confuse them because we need them to make the three arcs of the same circle, namely, the three arcs that bear down on desire.

The three maledictions are:

1. You will lack every time you desire;
2. You will only hope for discharges;
3. You will pursue the impossible jouissance.

Desire is thus completely ensnared, it is taken up in a circle.

How then is the problem of statements the same thing? It's the same at the level of the Cartesian cogito, since you also construct your circle at the level of I walk, I breathe, I imagine, I see a unicorn, a system of statements in which the I [je] is the subject of the statement, and that is something like the appearance. Perhaps it's not true, perhaps God is deceiving me, perhaps I believe I'm walking but I'm not walking. Second arc: but watch out, for if it's true that I can be deceived when I say I'm walking, in return I cannot deceive myself when I say "I think I'm walking." If it is true that I can be deceived when I say "I see a unicorn," I cannot be deceived when I say "I think I'm seeing a unicorn." That's the extraction of the "I think, therefore I am," it's the extraction of the subject of enunciation; and the production of the statement, of any statement, is made in the form of a splitting of the subject into the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement, as the condition of the production of any possible statement.

Desire-lack is found at the level of the splitting of the subject, of the cut, the bar. The desire-pleasure system is found at the level of the subject of the statement. And the desire-jouissance system is found at the level of the glory of the subject of enunciation, once again with the mystification of the circle: you will command all the more insofar as you obey, i.e., you will be all the more ready to be a true subject of enunciation insofar as you conform yourself to the bar that separates you as a subject of the statement from the subject of enunciation. In other words, it's through castration that you accede to desire.

To say: it's through castration that you accede to desire, or to say: it's through the splitting of the subject that you accede to the production of statements, is the same thing.

Kyril Rejik: You don't want to go further with Descartes' God and Lacan's signifier?

Gilles Deleuze: I don't want to, but I will, ouaf! ouaf! ouaf!

The problem becomes: supposing we say that only statements. . . that's desire. Every desire is a statement, all statements are desires. If things are indeed like that, what we must give an account of is the system of appearance; then it goes without saying that Nietzsche was completely right, it's truly a Platonic Christian system. And if that leads to psychoanalysis, it's not by chance, because psychoanalysis is the thing that says to us, "Come here, lie down, you're finally going to be able to speak in your name," and which, at the same time, withdraws in advance all possible conditions for the production of statements, precisely because it has subordinated all production of statements to the splitting of the subject of enunciation and the subject of the statement, i.e., you will command all the more insofar as you accept castration and you pursue the impossible jouissance.

Richard III: It seems to me that desire-discharge is taken up again in Lacan in the form of metonymy, it's not far -- but this is only an intuition -- from desire -- aufhebung, and that finally the entire history of desire which is displaced and which one never manages to get to, is the trajectory of the Phenomenology of Spirit, broadly speaking. With precisely this jouissance, as an impossible horizon, which would be absolute knowledge.

Gilles Deleuze: If you like, but there is no reason to privilege Hegel, because he is one of the multiple cases where desire is defined as lack, but in the pages just before those on the master and slave, everything passes through this circle: desire-lack, the illusion of pleasure, and desire-jouissance.

Richard III: What's really interesting is that if you tie desire to the field of the Other and to the treasure of the signifier, you truly have the process of Erinnerung. . .

Gilles Deleuze: Yes, it's not by chance that Lacan passed through Hegel; he has suppressed his Hegelian texts. . . .

The problem is that it will be necessary to explain the formation of this appearance: Under what conditions do statements appear to be produced by a subject which, as the producer of statements, would then necessarily be split into a subject of the statement and the subject of enunciation. And above all, what does that permit as a falling-back [rabattement]? These are things we have already done, you have two possible fallings-back: either the subject of enunciation -- in any case, the splitting makes them fall back on each other -- either the subject of enunciation will fall back on the subject of the statement, and that will be the Oedipal apparatus, or else the subject of the statement will be granted to the subject of enunciation, and that will be the paranoiac apparatus. The paranoiac is the subject of the statement that takes itself to be the subject of enunciation.

I fear that there is no explanation that will make the formula any less dismal. The paranoiac is truly someone who establishes himself between everything that can be used as a sign in a network, or a system of networks, such that the sign refers to another sign. The sign no longer refers either to the earth, or to a body, or to a thing, the sign refers to another sign in a system of networks. Consequently, and at the same time, it is subsumed under a signifier. And this signifier is what represents it for another signifier, the subject, following a well-known formula, namely: the signifier is precisely the subject of enunciation. And the position of the paranoiac is very typical and very formidable, because he is both the person who doubts the most and the person who has the greatest power. Paranoia swarms in every direction: a sign here, oh, here's another one, oh, but over there, etc. It's not like that in all deliriums. Once again, a paranoiac is networks, and when he is taken in the networks, he doubts everything, he says to himself: perhaps I'm being deceived. As a subject of the statement, he is perpetually in a kind of doubt, but at the same time, he recuperates everything, and he recuperates a certitude, he is the distributor of signs, he is powerful and omnipotent to the degree that he leaps, he is unstable, at the level of the subject of enunciation, and the formula of the paranoiac is at the level: I have guessed in advance. He passes his time oscillating inside his network of signs. It will be necessary to give an account of this production of an appearance. Once again, the appearance consists in this: statements would be produced by a subject thus split. How was this thing here able to produce that thing there? And this is the problem: How to say "me" [moi]? How to dare to say "me"? As soon as I say "me," I situate myself both as a subject of the statement and a subject of enunciation. And whenever there is this cleavage, there's all this rubbish [saloperie] that comes along with it. I mean, for example: "Me as a human being." All social functions are constructed on that, all repressive functions are constructed on this cleavage: me as human being, you understand, but as a father, I must act! Me as human being, I'm on you side; but as a cop, I have to apply the law! As a cop, I have to apply the law, which means that I'm the subject of the statement. As a man, I understand you: that means I'm the subject of enunciation. I will be a legislator all the more insofar as I am a subject, you will be a subject all the more insofar as you are legislators, we all understand each other. . . . This is a way of saying: OK, we are all castrated, it works.

What we were saying last week was: there are no individual statements, no statement can be produced by an individual. Our hypothesis was that what produces statements were machinic assemblages, or what amounts to the same thing, collective agents of enunciation -- on the condition that we understand that collective does not mean peoples, but that it means, in whatever sense the term is taken: what must be called collective agents of enunciation are all multiplicities, whatever their nature. So that we must explain how machinic agents of enunciation effectively produce variable statements in such and such circumstances, and produce new types of statements; how these statements are necessarily desires; and how, within this production, the illusion of the subject is engendered, of a subject split into a subject of enunciation and a subject of the statement, who has the impression of producing statements which, in fact, are produced by machinic assemblages or by the multiplicities acting in him.

We have to see how all this happens. We have to pose the problem practically! We have to pose a series of oppositions, we have to make a table: how is a body without organs produced, the first production of the statement. I mean: if something, in given conditions, does not function as a body without organs, there is no surface on which to inscribe a statement. A body without organs is the surface of inscription for every statement or for every desire. Except there is not a single body without organs, there are as many as you like. It's a thing to produce or fabricate. A body without organs does not preexist. Last time, I took the desert as a model, but on the condition that certain things take place on it. The desert is indeed a place or a surface for the production of statements. There are no statements linked to drugs that do not presuppose as prior the constitution of a body without organs. . . . whatever takes place on the order of the event, i.e., the statement or desire, the event is finally the very identity of the statement and of desire, whatever takes place implies the constitution of a body without organs. As long as you have not made your body without organs, alone, with someone else, with n people, nothing is possible, you have to find your own. . . .

In the bad column, that of the false conception of desire, we'll put the organism. Here, it would be necessary to show how a body without organs is formed on this organism, how there appears on it a probe head, a machinic point, and this machinic point is this instance of movement that will be found later in this or that assemblage. The body without organs, the desert, is fundamentally populated. The problem of the unconscious is not really that of generations, it is a problem of population, it is a mater of know how one populates. When Green writes, don't go too far, a schizophrenic is someone who has a father and mother like everybody else, it's not true. . . .

I have here a text by an old schizo, it's very beautiful, this text. It's made up of tales: "I love to invent people, tribes, the origins of a race; and to imagine other behaviours, a thousand other ways of being. I have always had a complex for exploration and I only like to count on very fantastic explorations. For example, my deserts are like diversions, desert-diversions, for whomever can imagine these strange simulators of ***** , these kind of oneiric songs. I let myself go; I have the tendency to put my guilty experiences on my characters, to mistreat them" -- you see it is a matter of populating the desert -- "to use mental cruelty against them, by provocation. I have the rage to imagine how that can work, a being in an extreme situation, after all, it's a passion . . . [tape inaudible]." In all these tales, it is solely a question of deserts populated with tribes: "I return to my tribes, to this day I am the adopted son of fifteen tribes, not one less; and these are my adopted tribes, for I love each one of them more and better than if I'd been born in them. Over there, a child has the right to adopt another tribe. There are many renegade children, and they don't feel exiled at all. But their true parents? What do you mean by their true parents? Their true progenitors, their parents, are first of all whomever the child recognises as such, progenitors or adopted, that is to say, the tribes." One is a child of a population and not the child of a father or a mother. A schizo thinks like that.

In the other column, as opposed to assemblages of multiplicities, there is the theme of the subject of enunciation, the split subject as the source of dualisms. To the anti-Oedipal apparatus is opposed the Oedipal apparatus, or to the becoming inhuman, the becoming animal, is opposed the becoming human of the other column. To monism-pluralism is opposed the dualities that follow from the false conception of the statement. To desire or the thought-process is opposed the conception of desire-lack-pleasure-jouissance; just as the two statuses of the sign we looked at last time are opposed, namely, the sign gathered together in a network that subordinates it to the signifier, and on the contrary, the sign that sets to work on its own account, that frees itself from the hypothesis of the signifier and which is coupled with a particle or a system of particles, i.e., the sign-particle as opposed to the sign-signifier. It would be necessary to know what machinic point marks the maximum of deterritorialization on this body without organs; this history of the machinic point that will mark the currents of deterritorialization on the BwO seems to me to be very complicated. It is also necessary to see the machinic assemblages that flow from it, and then the becomings animal, or, what amounts to the same thing, the intensities. The deterritorialized intensities that crisscross [quadrillent] the body without organs. And in all this, the subject is, à la lettre, a nomadic particle which traverses all that, the lines of deterritorialization, the intensities. The problem of the genesis of the illusion is: What is going to fix the subject? At the same time, it will be turned into an organism, it will be submitted to the cogito, it will be fixed, its submission will be assured, by telling it: it's you who produces statements.

Next time, we'll have to look at Carlos Casteneda's book. It recounts, broadly speaking, not an initiation, but truly an experimentation. The guy would indeed like to be initiated, because he's a poor guy, and the Indian tells him no problem. Carlos says to him: teach me, I want to know, i.e., he treats the old Indian like one treats one's psychoanalyst, and the Indian tells him: begin by finding your body without organs. Carlos's search for his BwO is pathetic, he is looking in a restrained space, in a kind of desert, that's the joyous experimentation; and in a certain way, this search is to find the place where one is at ease [la place où on est bien]. From a schizoanalytic perspective, the guy has to find where he is at ease, and in what position, if he wants to hang from the ceiling. . . . There's no reason for him to lie down. And Carlos looks for his place by rolling around in the grass, he seeks until he finds. Once he's found his place, he no longer lives as a subject, but as a tiny thing [truc], a tiny particle, and then there is a more brilliant particle, the Indian. Then, a machinic assemblage begins. In what form? In the form that it is necessary to have an ally. On the one hand, it is necessary to have a teacher, an experimenter, but it is also necessary to have a powerful ally. All this begins to make a little machine where something is going to happen; a certain distribution of intensities is already being drawn on this body without organs. And then he sees a dog, he plays at being dog [il fait le chien], but it's not that either, he doesn't play dog; he is in the process of undoing the organisation of the body in favor of something else. One feels that the problem is not that of becoming animal; the dog is not a dog. The Indian says: that's not a dog, it's anything at all, whatever you like. What is this type of becoming inhuman, which is expressed badly in saying "he's playing dog"? He has traversed certain intensities, which one can represent by: dog, as in Kafka. Kafka also plays dog, but he doesn't need drugs to do so; he invented another machine for himself in order to do it. At the end, Carlos annoys the Indian so much that the Indian says to him, "But this dog, what, you take yourself for what? It's not your whore of a mother." That's anti-psychoanalysis. This dog here is the outcome [sortie] of the Oedipal apparatus. He followed his body without organs, lines of deterritorialization following deterritorialized intensities.

Why these intensities rather than others? He'll then become a lizard; then he'll progress, he'll become a crow. To play the crow [faire le corbeau] truly consists in making the legs and wings of the crow grow from his face, to be populated with crows. It was not to play dog, it was to be populated with dogs. To play dog, it is not enough to go "woof, woof, woof," one has to pass through other experimentations.

This changes everything in the problem of totemism. When structuralists speak of totemism, it's rather poor, dry. Totemism has always had certain relations with the history of drugs, but it is not that at all, for in the second book, where the experimentation continues even more strongly, we witness the passage from becoming inhuman, from becoming intense to something yet again which is a kind of becoming molecular, as if the disorganisation of the organism in favor of a body living in another mode, again implying something more. And that's clairvoyance. What does it mean to see inside? That consists above all in seeing water, and Carlos, through an entire series of stages, sees the water that is modified, hardened, immobilised, and which, above all, is dissociated. At the end, it is molecularized and he grasps the water through its constitutive bubbles; but he can't grasp and see the water through the constitutive molecular bubbles except in connection [liaison] with what is produced by experimentation . . .

[end of the tape]